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ABSTRACT
e security of billions of devices worldwide depends on the secu-
rity and robustness of the mainline Linux kernel. However, the in-
creasing number of kernel-specific vulnerabilities, especially mem-
ory safety vulnerabilities, shows that the kernel is a popular and
practically exploitable target. Two major causes of memory safety
vulnerabilities are reference counter overflows (temporal memory
errors) and lack of pointer bounds checking (spatial memory er-
rors).
To succeed in practice, security mechanisms for critical systems
like the Linux kernel must also consider performance and deploy-
ability as critical design objectives. We present and systematically
analyze two such mechanisms for improving memory safety in
the Linux kernel: (a) an overflow-resistant reference counter data
structure designed to accommodate typical reference counter us-
age in kernel source code, and (b) runtime pointer bounds check-
ing using Intel MPX in the kernel.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Operating systems security;
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1 INTRODUCTION
e Linux kernel lies at the foundation of millions of different
devices around us, ranging from servers and desktops to smart-
phones and embedded devices. While there are many solutions for
strengthening Linux application security covering access control
frameworks (SELinux [42], AppArmor [3]), integrity protection
systems (IMA/EVM [17], dm-verity [13]), encryption, key manage-
ment and auditing, they are rendered ineffective if an aacker can
gain control of the kernel. Recent trends in Common Vulnerabili-
ties and Exposures (CVEs) indicate a renewed interest in exploiting
the kernel [27]. Kernel bugs are long-lived, on average taking five
years before being found and fixed [8], and even when fixed, secu-
rity updates might not be deployed to all vulnerable devices. us,
we cannot rely solely on retroactive bug fixes, but need proactive
measures to harden the kernel by limiting its exploitability. is is
the goal of the Kernel Self Protection Project (KSPP) [21], a large
community of volunteers working on themainline Linux kernel. In
this paper, we describe our contributions, as part of the KSPP, to
the development of two recent kernel memory safety mechanisms.
Depending on their severity, memory errors can allow an at-
tacker to read, write, or execute memory, thus making them at-
tractive targets. For example, use-aer-free errors and buffer over-
flows feature prominently in recent Linux kernel CVEs [5, 37]. Mem-
ory errors arise due to the lack of inherent memory safety in C, the
main implementation language of the Linux kernel. ere are two
fundamental classes of memory errors:
Temporal memory errors occur when pointers to uninitial-
ized or freed memory are dereferenced. One common case is a
use-aer-free error e.g., dereferencing a pointer that has been pre-
maturely freed by another execution thread. A null pointer derefer-
ence error, although common, is more challenging to exploit [48],
whereas use-aer-free errors are both exploitable and common,
and have featured in CVE-2014-2851, CVE-2016-4558, and CVE-
2016-0728, among others.
Spatial memory errors occur when pointers are used to ac-
cess memory outside the bounds of their intended areas. A prime
example is a buffer overflow, which occurs when the amount of
data wrien exceeds the size of the buffer. Spatial memory errors
have appeared in CVE-2014-0196, CVE-2016-8440, CVE-2016-8459,
and CVE-2017-7895.
Whilememory safety has been scrutinized for decades (Section 7),
much of the work has focused on user-space. ese solutions are
not readily transferable to kernel-space.
For instance, solutions to protect against spatial memory errors
use a static and fast addressing scheme to store pointer bounds by
treating virtual memory as an endless physical memory [26, 38].
is approach is not viable in kernel-space as it cannot trivially
handle arbitrary page faults. Although there have been a few pro-
posals for improving kernel memory safety (e.g., kCFI [40] and KE-
NALI [44]), these have not considered the critical issue of deploya-
bility in the mainline Linux kernel. Other mechanisms, such as the
widely used Kernel Address Sanitizer (KASAN) [19], are intended
as debugging facilities, not runtime protection.
In this paper, we present solutions formitigating themajor causes
of both temporal and spatial memory errors: (1) we contributed
to the design of refcount t a new reference counter data type
that prevents reference counter overflows; in particular, we ana-
lyzed how developers have used reference counters in the kernel,
and based on this we designed extensions to the new refcount t
API; and (2) we developed a mechanism for performing efficient
pointer bounds checking at runtime, using Intel Memory Protec-
tion Extensions (MPX). e new refcount t data structure and
API are already integrated into the Linux mainline kernel. More
than half our patches (123/233 at the time of writing) to convert
existing reference counters to use refcount t have also been al-
ready integrated.
In summary, we claim the following contributions:
• Extended refcount t API: We present a heuristic technique
to identify instances of reference counters in the kernel source
code (Section 4.1). By analyzing reference counter usage in the
kernel, we designed extensions to theAPI of the new refcount t
reference counter data structure (Section 4.3). We also con-
verted the entire kernel source tree to use the new API (Sec-
tion 4.6).
• MPXK: We present a spatial memory error prevention mecha-
nism for the Linux kernel based on the recently released Intel
Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) (Section 5).
• Evaluation: We present a systematic analysis of refcount t
and MPXK in terms of performance, security, and usability for
kernel developers. (Section 6).
Our primary objective in this work was to deploy our results into
the mainline Linux kernel. In Section 8 we reflect on our expe-
rience in this regard, and offer suggestions for other researchers
with the same objective.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Linux kernel reference counters
Temporal memory errors are especially challenging in low-level
systems that cannot rely on automated facilities such as garbage
collection for object destruction and freeing of allocated memory.
In simple non-concurrent C programs, objects typically have well
defined and predictable allocation and release paerns, whichmake
it trivial to free them manually. However, complex systems, such
as the Linux kernel, rely heavily on object reuse and sharing pat-
terns to minimize CPU and memory use.
In lieu of high-level facilities like garbage collection, object life-
times can be managed by using reference counters to keep track
of current uses of an object [7]. Whenever a new reference to an
object is taken, the object’s reference counter is incremented, and
whenever the object is released the counter is decremented. When
the counter reaches zero,
it means that the object is no longer used anywhere, so the ob-
ject can be safely destroyed and its associatedmemory can be freed.
However, reference counting schemes are historically error prone;
A missed increment or decrement, oen in a rarely exercised code
path, could imbalance the counter and cause either a memory leak
or a use-aer-free error.
Reference counters in the Linux kernel are typically implemented
using the atomic t type [25], which in turn is implemented as
an int with a general purpose atomic API consisting of over 100
functions. is approach poses two problems. First, the general
purpose API provides ample room for subtly incorrect implemen-
tations of reference counting schemes motivated by performance
or implementation shortcuts.
Second, as a general purpose integer atomic t
allows its instances to overflow. When reference counters are
based on atomic t, this implies that they can inadvertently reach
zero via only increments. Overflow bugs are particularly hard to
detect using static code analysis or fuzzing techniques because
they require many consequent iterations before the overflow hap-
pens [32]. A recent surge of exploitable errors, such as CVE-2014-
2851, CVE-2016-4558, CVE-2016-0728, CVE-2017-7487 and CVE-
2017-8925, specifically target reference counters.
2.2 Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX)
Intel Memory Protection Extensions (MPX) [38] is a recent tech-
nology to prevent spatial memory errors. It is supported on both
Pentium core andAtom coremicro-architectures from Skylake and
Goldmount onwards, thus targeting a significant range of end de-
vices from desktops to mobile and embedded processors. In order
to use the MPX hardware, both the compiler and operating system
must support MPX. On Linux, MPX is supported by the GCC and
ICC compilers, and the kernel supports MPX for user-space appli-
cations. MPX is source and binary compatible, meaning that no
source code changes are required and that MPX-instrumented bi-
naries can be linked with non-MPX binaries (e.g., system libraries).
MPX-instrumented binaries can still be run on all systems, includ-
ing legacy systems without MPX hardware. If MPX hardware is
available, the instrumented binaries will automatically detect and
configure this hardware during process initialization.
MPXprevents spatialmemory errors by checking pointer bounds
before a pointer is dereferenced. Conceptually, every pointer is as-
sociated with an upper and lower bound. Pointer bounds are de-
termined by means of compile-time code instrumentation. For a
given pointer, the bounds can either be set statically (e.g., based
on static data structure sizes), or dynamically (e.g., using instru-
mented memory allocators). For example, malloc is instrumented
to set the bounds of newly allocated pointers.
In order to perform a bounds check, the pointer’s bounds must
be loaded in one of the four newMPXbound (bndx) registers. When
not in these registers, the MPX instrumentation stores bounds on
the stack or in static memory. However, in some cases the num-
ber of bounds to be stored cannot be determined at compile time
(e.g., a dynamically-sized array of pointers). In these cases, bounds
are stored in memory in a new two-level metadata structure, and
accessed using the new bound load (bndldx) and store (bndstx)
instructions. ese instructions use the address of the pointer to
look up an entry in the process’s Bound Directory (BD), which in
turn points into a operating system managed Bound Table (BT),
which stores the pointer’s address and bounds. On 64-bit systems
the BD is 2 GB, and each individual BT is 4 MB. To reduce this high
memory overhead, the Linux kernel only allocates physical mem-
ory to the BD regions when they are wrien to, and only allocates
individual BTs when they are accessed.
When a bounds check fails, the CPU issues an exception that
must be handled by the operating system.
3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
e goal of this work is to limit the Linux kernel’s vulnerability to
memory safety errors, with a focus on common errors and aacks.
Specifically, we focus on preventing two causes of memory errors:
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• Reference counter overflows: the security requirement is to
design a reference counter type and associated API such that
the counter is guaranteed never to overflow.
• Out-of-bounds memory accesses: the security requirement
is to design an access control scheme that prevents out-of-bounds
accesses.
In addition to the security requirements,
the following are mandatory design considerations if the solu-
tion is to be used in practice:
• Performance. Any solutions added to the kernel must mini-
mize performance impact. Some subsystems, such as network-
ing and filesystem, are particularly sensitive to performance.
Securitymechanisms perceived as imposing a high performance
overhead risk being rejected by the maintainers of these sub-
systems. Furthermore, the Linux kernel runs on a vast range
of devices, including closed fixed-function devices like routers,
where soware aacks are not a threat but performance re-
quirements are stringent. us, the solutions must adapt or be
configurable depending on the needs of different usage scenar-
ios.
• Deployability. Given our goal of integrating our solutions
into the mainline Linux kernel, their implementation must fol-
low the Linux kernel design guidelines, imposeminimal kernel-
wide changes, and be both maintainable and usable. Usability
for kernel developers is particularly crucial for new features that
may be adopted at the discretion of subsystem developers.
4 REFERENCE COUNTER OVERFLOWS
We developed a methodology to find reference counters in the ker-
nel source code as well as analyze how they are typically used. A
new type refcount t and corresponding minimal API were intro-
duced by Peter Zijlstra, one of the Linux maintainers of related sub-
systems. It provides various reference counter specific protections
by preventing some outright incorrect behavior, i.e., incrementing
on zero and overflowing the counter. Based on our analysis of ref-
erence counter use, we proposed several additions to the initial
refcount t API, making it widely usable as a replacement for ex-
isting reference counters and future implementations. To compre-
hensively prevent reference counter overflows, we have developed
a set of patches to convert all conventional reference counters in
the kernel to use refcount t.
4.1 Analyzing Linux Kernel reference counters
Reference counters are spread across the Linux kernel. We thus
systematically analyzed the source code to locate instances of ref-
erence counters based on the atomic t type using Coccinelle [6],
a static analyzer integrated into the Linux Kernel build system
(KBuild). Coccinelle takes code paerns as input and finds (or re-
places) their occurrences in the given code base. We defined three
such code paerns to identify reference counters based on their
behavior (see Listing 3 in the Appendix for the full paerns):
(1) Freeing a referenced object based on the return value from
atomic dec and test or one its variants. is is the archetyp-
ical reference counter use case.
(2) Using atomic add return to decrement a variable and com-
pare its updated value, typically against zero. ese use cases
are essentially variations of the basic dec and test cases al-
beit using a different function for the implementation.
(3) Using atomic add unless to decrement a counter only when
its value differs from one. is case is less common.
ese paerns are strong indicators that the identified object
employs an atomic t reference counting scheme. So far, this ap-
proach detected all occurrences of reference counters. Some false
positiveswere reported, particularly on implementations with atomic t
variables that occasionally exhibit reference counter-like behavior.
For example, under one condition an object might be freed when
such counter reaches zero (behaves like a reference counter), but
under a different condition the object might instead be recycled
when the counter reaches zero (see Section 4.5 for examples).
Of the 250 atomic t variables reported on an unmodified v4.10
kernel we havemanually confirmed 233 variables as reference coun-
ters.
4.2 refcount t API
e initial refcount tAPI, introduced by Peter Zijlstra1 (Listing 1),
was designed around strict semantically correct reference counter
use. is meant that beyond set and read calls, the API provided
only two incrementing functions, both of which refuse to incre-
ment the counter when its value is zero, and three variations of
decrementing functions that enforce the checking of return values
via compile timewarnings. When decrementing the caller needs to
know if the value reached zero, which is indicated by a return value
of true. A true return value from refcount inc not zeromeans
that the counter was non-zero, indicating that the referenced ob-
ject is safe to use.
Listing 1: Initial bare refcount t API.
void refcount_set (refcount_t *r, unsigned int n);
unsigned int refcount_read (const refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_inc_not_zero(refcount_t *r);
void refcount_inc (refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_dec_and_test(refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_dec_and_mutex_lock(refcount_t *r,
struct mutex *lock);
bool refcount_dec_and_lock(refcount_t *r,
spinlock_t *lock);
e checks are performed to ensure that a reference counter
reaching zero triggers object release, thus preventing a potential
memory leak, whereas increment on zero is prohibited to avoid
potential use-aer-free, as illustrated in Figure 1.
e main challenge in designing the refcount t API was how
to deal with an event that would otherwise cause the counter to
overflow. One approach would be to simply ignore the event, such
that the counter remains at its maximum value. However, this
means that the number of references to the object will be greater
than the maximum counter value. If the counter is subsequently
decremented, it will reach zero and the object will be freed before
all references have been released (i.e., leading to a use-aer-free
error). To overcome this challenge, the refcount t API instead
saturates the counter, such that it remains at its maximum value,
even if there are subsequent increment or decrement events. A sat-
urated counter would, therefore, result in a memory leak since the
1hp://lwn.net/Articles/713645/
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Thread 1 Thread 2
if(dec_and_test(obj->counter)) 
// true, counter = 0
increment(obj->counter)
// counter: 0->1
free (obj)
allocate(obj)
counter = 1
do some operation
on the object
do some operation
on the object
USE AFTER FREE
Figure 1: Potential use-aer-free when incrementing a ref-
erence counter from zero.
object will never be freed. However, a cleanly logged memory leak
is a small price to pay for avoiding the potential security vulnera-
bilities of a reference counter overflow. is approach is similar to
that previously used by the PaX/Grsecurity patches [4].
4.3 Our extensions to the refcount t API
Our efforts in finding existing reference counters revealed several
variations of the strict archetypical reference counting schemes,
which are incompatible with the initial refcount t API. As a re-
sult, we designed several API additions that got integrated into the
Linux kernel2 . e new API calls are shown in Listing 2.
Listing 2: Our additions to the refcount t API.
void refcount_add (unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_add_not_zero(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
void refcount_dec (refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_dec_if_one(refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_dec_not_one(refcount_t *r);
void refcount_sub (refcount_t *r);
bool refcount_sub_and_test(unsigned int i, refcount_t *r);
e functions allowing arbitrary additions and subtractions, i.e.,
the refcount add and refcount sub variants, are needed in situ-
ations where larger value changes are needed. For example, the
sk wmem alloc variable in the networking subsystem serves as a
reference counter but also tracks transfer queue, which need ar-
bitrary additions and subtractions. refcount sub and test and
refcount add not zero also provide a return value that, that in-
dicate that the counter reached the value of zero. refcount dec
accommodates situations where the forced return value checks
would incur needless overhead. For instance, some functions in the
btrfs filesystem handle nodes that are guaranteed to be cached,
i.e., at least the reference held by the cache will be remaining. Fi-
nally, refcount dec if one and refcount dec not one enable schemes
that require specific operations before or instead of releasing ob-
jects. For instance, the networking subsystem extensively utilizes
paerns where the value of one indicates that an objects is invalid,
but can be recycled.
2hp://www.openwall.com/lists/kernel-hardening/2016/11/28/4
4.4 Implementation considerations
To avoid costly lock or mutex use the refcount t API generic, i.e.,
not architecture specific, implementation uses the compare-and-
swap paern, which is built around the atomic atomic cmpxchg
function, shown in Algorithm 1. On x86 atomic cmpxchg is imple-
mented as a a single atomic CPU instruction, but the implemen-
tation is guaranteed to be atomic regardless of architecture. e
function always returns the prior value but exchanges it only if it
was equal to the given condition value comp. e compare-and-
swap works by indefinitely looping until a cmpxchg succeeds. is
avoids costly locks and allows all but the cmpxchg to be non-atomic.
Note that in the typical case, without concurrent modifications, the
loop runs only once, thus being muchmore efficient than locks and
potential blocking of execution.
Algorithm 1 cmpxchg(atomic , comp, new) sets the value of atomic
to new if, and only if, the prior value of atomic was equal to comp.
Whether the value was changed or not the function always returns
the prior value of atomic. In practice the function is implemented
as a single inline CPU instruction.
1: old ← atomic .value
2: if old = comp then
3: atomic .value← new
4: end if
5: return old
As an example of the extended refcount t API implementa-
tion, consider the refcount add not zero function shown in Al-
gorithm 2. It is used to increase refcount t when acquiring a
reference to the associated object, a return value of true indicates
that the counter was non-zero, and thus the associated object is
safe to use. e actual value from a user perspective is thus irrele-
vant and refcount add not zero guarantees only that the return
value is true if, and only if, the value of refcount t at the time of
the call was non-zero. Internally the function further guarantees
that the increment takes place only when the prior value was in
the open interval (0,U INT MAX ), thus preventing use-aer-free
due to increment from zero and use-aer-free due to overflow. is
case results in the default return statement at line 19. Aempted
increment from zero or UINT MAX results in returns at lines 3 and 6,
respectively. Finally, an addition that would overflow the counter
instead saturates it by seing its value to UINT MAX on line 10.
4.5 Challenges
Despite the additions to the refcount t API, several reference
counting instances nonetheless required careful analysis and in
some cases challengingmodifications to the underlying logic. ese
challenges were the main reason for not using Coccinelle to auto-
matically convert reference counting schemes. e most common
challenges are object pool paerns and unconventional reference
counters.
While the object pool paern is accommodated by our additions
to the refcount t API - namely, by providing functions that dis-
tinguish the value one - such implementations typically employ
negative values or other means to distinguish between freed and
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Algorithm 2 refcount add not zero (refcount , summand) at-
tempts to add a summand to the value of refcount , and returns
true if, and only if, the prior value was non-zero. Note that the
function is not locked and only the cmpxchg (line 13) is atomic, i.e.,
the value of refcount.value can change at any point of execution.
e loop ensures that the cmpxchg eventually succeeds. Overflow
protection is provided by checking if the value is already saturated
(line 6) and by saturating, instead of overflowing, on line 10.
Ensure: retval = true⇔ re f count .value > 0
Ensure: value unchanged ⇔ re f count .value ∈ {0,UINT MAX }
1: val ← refcount.value {use local copy}
2: while true do
3: if val = 0 then
4: return false {counter not incremented from zero}
5: end if
6: if val = UINT MAX then
7: return true {counter is saturated, thus not zero}
8: end if
9: new ← val + summand {calculate new value}
10: if new < val then
11: new ← UINT MAX {Saturate instead of overflow}
12: end if
13: old ← atomic cmpxchg(refcount.atomic, val, new)
14: if old = val then {if refcount.value was unchanged, then}
15: break {value was updated by cmpxchg}
16: end if
17: val ← old {update val for next iteration}
18: end while
19: return true {value incremented}
recyclable objects. ese paerns therefore oen necessitated non-
trivial changes to ensure that neither increment on zero opera-
tions nor negative values are expected. Overall we encountered
6 particularly challenging recycling schemes. For example, the
inode refcount t conversion spanned a total of 10 patches3 and
required so many changes that it has not yet been accepted by the
maintainer.
In some cases reference counters were used in non-conventional
ways, such as to govern other behavior or track other statistics in
addition to the strict reference count itself (e.g., the network socket
sk wmem alloc variable mentioned above).
e refcount tAPI can be surprising or outright erroneous for
such unconventional uses; it might for instance be expected that
such variables can be incremented from zero or potentially reach
negative values. Our conversion efforts touched upon 21 reference
counters in this category.
4.6 Deployment of refcount t
We developed 233 distinct kernel patches, each converting one
distinct variable, spanning all the kernel subsystems. During our
work, the refcount t API, with our additions, was also finalized
in the mainline Linux kernel. e next stage of our work consisted
of submiing all the patches to the respective kernel maintainers
and adapting them based on their feedback. Based discussions
3hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/2/24/599
with maintainers, some patches were permanently dropped, either
because they would require extensive changes in affected subsys-
tems or would incur unacceptable performance penalty without
any realistic risk of actually overflowing the particular counter.
As explained in Section 3, some performance-sensitive systems
proved challenging to convert due to performance concerns. As a
result, a new CONFIG REFCOUNT FULL kernel configuration option
was added to allow switching the refcount t protections off and
thus use the new API without any performance overhead. is can
be utilized by devices that have high performance requirements
but are less concerned about security based on their nature (e.g.,
closed devices such as routers that do not allow installation of un-
trusted soware). ese patching efforts, discussions, and patch
reviews also uncovered related reference counting bugs that were
fixed in subsequent kernel patches4.
5 OUT-OF-BOUNDS MEMORY ACCESS
To prevent spatial memory errors in the Linux kernel, we have
adapted Intel MPX for in-kernel use. MPX was designed for both
user-space and kernel-space (e.g., the hardware includes separate
configuration registers for each). However, until now, the Linux
kernel and the GCC compiler only supported MPX for user-space
applications.
Our solution,MPX for Kernel (MPXK), is realized as a new GCC
instrumentation plugin (based on the existingMPX support inGCC).
In the following subsections, we describe the various challenges
of using MPX in the Linux kernel, and our respective solutions in
MPXK.
5.1 Memory use
efirst challenge arises from the high memory overhead incurred
by the MPX Bound Directory (BD) and Bound Tables (BT). As ex-
plained in Section 2.2, user-space MPX aempts to reduce this
overhead by allocating this memory only when needed. However,
this requires the kernel to step in at arbitrary points during ex-
ecution to handle page faults or Bound Faults caused by caused
by BD dereferences or unallocated BTs. is approach cannot be
used in MPXK because the kernel cannot handle page faults at ar-
bitrary points within its own execution. It is also not feasible to
pre-allocate the BD and BTs, as this would increase base memory
usage by over 500% and require extensive modifications to accom-
modate certain classes of pointers (e.g., pointers originating from
user-space). An alternative approach would be to substitute the
hardware-backed BD and BTs with our own metadata, similar to
SoBound [26] or KASAN [19]. However, this would still incur the
same memory and performance overheads as those systems.
To overcome this challenge, MPXKdynamically determines pointer
bounds using existing kernel metadata. Specifically, we re-use the
kernel memory management metadata created by kmalloc-based
allocators. We define a new function, mpxk load bounds, that uses
this existing metadata to determine the bounds for a pointer allo-
cated by kmalloc, and loads these into the MPX registers. A side-
effect of this approach is that bounds are rounded up to the nearest
allocator cache size (i.e., may be slightly larger than the requested
4hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/27/567, hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/28/383 etc.
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allocation size). However, this has no security implications be-
cause the allocator will not allocate any other objects in the round-
up memory area [1]. MPXK thus never uses the bndldx or bndstx
instructions. Our kernel instrumentation only uses mpxk load bounds
when the bounds cannot be determined at compile-time (e.g., for
dynamically allocated objects).
5.2 Kernel support code
In user-space, MPX is supported by GCC library implementations
for various support functionality, such as initialization and func-
tion wrappers. e user-space instrumentation initializes MPX
during process startup by allocating the BD in virtual memory
and initializing the MPX hardware. However, this existing initial-
ization code cannot be used directly in the Linux kernel because
kernel-space MPX must be configured during the kernel boot pro-
cess.
In user-space, the compiler also provides instrumented wrapper
functions for all memorymanipulation functions, such as memmove,
strcpy, and malloc. ese user-space wrappers check incoming
pointer bounds and ensure that the correct bounds are associated
with the returned pointers. ey are also responsible for updat-
ing the BD and BTs (e.g., memcopy must duplicate any BD and BT
entries associated with the copied memory). However, these user-
space wrappers also cannot be used in the kernel because the ker-
nel implements its own standard library.
MPXK includes new code to initialize theMPX hardware during
the kernel boot process. is is done bywriting theMPX configura-
tion into each CPU’s bndcfgsMachine Specific Register (MSR). Al-
though MPXK does not use a BD, it still reserves an address space
for the BD but does not back this up with physical memory. is is
done to ensure that any erroneous and/or malicious invocations of
the bndldx or bndstx instructions will cause page faults and crash
the kernel instead of potentially overwriting arbitrary memory.
MPXK includes a new set of kernel-specific wrapper functions,
which are implemented as normal in-kernel library functions, and
used by our new MPXK GCC-plugin. e MPXK wrappers are
substantially less complex (and thus easier to audit for security)
than their user-space counterparts, because the MPXK wrappers
do not need to include logic for updating the DB or BTs.
5.3 Binary compatibility (Mixed code)
MPXK, like MPX, is binary compatible and can therefore be used
in mixed environments with both MPXK enabled code and legacy
(non-instrumented) code. A fundamental problem for any binary-
compatible bounds checking scheme is that the instrumentation
cannot track pointer manipulation performed by legacy code and
therefore cannot make any assumptions about the pointer bounds
aer the execution flow returns from the legacy code. MPX of-
fers a partial solution by storing the pointer’s value together with
its bounds (using the bndstx instruction) before entering legacy
code. When the legacy code returns and bndldx is used to load
the bounds again, this instruction will reset the pointer bounds,
i.e. making them essentially infinite, if it detects that the current
pointer value has been changed. However, MPXK does not use the
bndstx and bndldx instructions but instead always aempt to load
such bounds using mpxk load bounds. Note that this does give an
additional advantage compare to MPX, since MPXK is able to load
the bounds based on the pointer value.
Function arguments, both in MPX and MPXK, rely on the caller
to supply bounds. As such, these schemes cannot determine bounds
for arguments when called from non-instrumented code. In both
MPX and MPXK, these bounds therefore cannot be checked. As
future work, we are investigating how to determine such bounds
using the new MPXK bound load function described above.
5.4 Kernel instrumentation
e MPXK instrumentation is based on the existing MPX support
in GCC, but uses a new GCC plugin to adapt this for use in the ker-
nel. As described above, this new plugin instruments the kernel
code with the new MPXK bound loading function, MPXK initial-
ization code, and kernel-space wrapper functions. is plugin uses
the GCC plugin system that has been incorporated into Kbuild,
the Linux build system, since Linux v4.8. is means that MPXK
is seamlessly integrated with the regular kernel build workflow.
A developer simply needs to add predefined MPXK flags to any
Makefile entries in order to include MPXK instrumentation. e
plugin itself is implemented in four compiler passes, of which the
first three operate on the high-level intermediate representation,
GIMPLE, and the last on the lower-level RTL, as follows:
• mpxk pass wrappers replaces specificmemory-altering function
calls with their corresponding MPXK wrapper functions, e.g.,
replacing kmalloc calls mpxk wrapper kmalloc calls.
• mpxk pass cfun args inserts MPXK bound loads for function
arguments where bounds are not passed via the four bndx reg-
isters. is naturally happens whenmore than four bounds are
passed, or due to implementation specifics for any argument
beyond the sixth.
• mpxk pass bnd store replaces bndldx calls with MPXK bound
loads, and removes bndstx calls. is covers all high-level
(GIMPLE) loads and saves, including return values to legacy
function calls.
• mpxk pass sweeper is a final low-level pass that removes any
remaining bndldx and bndstx instructions. is pass is re-
quired to remove instructions that are inserted during the ex-
pansion from GIMPLE to RTL.
6 EVALUATION
We evaluate our proposed solutions against the requirements de-
fined in Section 3.
6.1 Security guarantees
We analyse the security guarantees of both refcount t andMPXK,
first through a principled theoretical analysis, and second by con-
sidering the mitigation of real-world vulnerabilities.
Reference counter overflows. With the exception of refcount set
and refcount read, all functions that modify refcount t can be
grouped into increasing and decreasing functions. All increasing
functions maintain the invariants that i) the resulting value will
not be smaller than the original and that ii) a value of zero
will not be increased. e decreasing functions maintain corre-
sponding invariants that i) the resulting valuewill not be larger
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than the original and that ii) a value of U INT MAX will not
be decreased.
For example, the increasing function refcount add not zero
(Algorithm 2) maintains the invariants as follows:
• input = 0: Lines 3- 4 prevent the counter being increased.
• input = U INT MAX : Lines 6- 7 ensure the counter will never
overflow.
• input ∈ (0,U INT MAX ): Lines 10- 11 ensure that the counter
value cannot overflow as a result of addition.
Line 13 ensures that the addition is performed atomically, thus
preventing unintended effects if interleaved threads update the
counter concurrently. Regardless of how the algorithm exits, the
invariant is maintained. e same exhaustive case-by-case enu-
meration can be used to prove that all other refcount t functions
maintain the invariants.
An aacker could still aempt to cause a use-aer-free error by
finding and invoking an extra decrement (i.e., decrement without
a corresponding increment). is is a fundamental issue inherent
in all reference counting schemes. However, the errors caused by
the extra decrement would almost certainly be detected early in
development or testing. In contrast, missing decrements are very
hard to detect through testing as they may require millions of in-
crements to a single counter before resulting in observable errors.
anks to the new refcount t, missing decrements can no longer
cause reference counter overflows.
In terms of real-world impact, refcount twould have prevented
several past exploits, including CVE-2014-2851, CVE-2016-0728, and
CVE-2016-4558. Although it is hard to quantify the current (and
future) security impact this will have on the kernel, observations
during our conversion efforts support the intuition that the strict
refcount t API discourages unsafe implementations. For exam-
ple, at least two new reference counting bugs5 were noticed and
fixed due to their incompatibility with the new API.
Out-of-bounds memory access. e objective of MPXK is to pre-
vent spatial memory errors by performing pointer bounds check-
ing. Specifically, for objects with known bounds, MPXK will en-
sure that pointers to those objects cannot be dereferenced outside
the object’s bounds (e.g., as would be the case in a classic buffer
overflow). A fundamental limitation of bounds checking schemes
is that there are various cases in which the correct object bounds
cannot be (feasibly) known by the scheme. We enumerate each of
these cases and show that MPXK is at least as secure as existing
schemes.
Pointer manipulation: If the aacker can corrupt a pointer’s
value to point to a different objectwithout dereferencing the pointer,
this can be used to subvert bounds checking schemes. For exam-
ple, object-centric schemes such as KASAN enforce bounds based
on the pointer’s value. If this value is changed to point within an-
other object’s bounds, the checkswill bemade (incorrectly) against
the laer object’s bounds. In theory, pointer-centric schemes such
as user-space MPX should not be vulnerable to this type of aack,
since they do not derive bounds based on the pointer’s value. How-
ever, presumably for compatibility reasons, if MPX detects that a
5hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/27/409, hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/3/28/383
pointer’s value has changed, it resets the pointer’s bounds (i.e., al-
lows it to access the full memory space). MPXK, like KASAN, will
use the corrupted value to infer an incorrect set of bounds. is is
therefore no worse than MPX or object-centric schemes. However,
it must be noted that this type of aack requires the aacker to
have a prior exploit to corrupt the pointer in the first place.
Legacy code: Binary-compatibility is a fundamental problem
for any scheme that tracks pointers’ bounds. is is manifest in
two cases: i) pointers returned from legacy (non-instrumented)
code to an instrumented caller, and ii) pointers passed from legacy
code as arguments to an instrumented function. In both cases,
the pointer bounds are not known and thus cannot be tracked by
the instrumented code. ese issues oen cannot be addressed
in binary-compatible systems, MPXK however, in case i), uses its
mpxk load bounds function to determine and load the bounds. One
potential solution for case ii) is to addmeta-data to track the bounds
from legacy callers. is could be done by relaxing the strict binary-
compatibility requirement, which may be feasible for the kernel,
since the whole code base is typically compiled at once. e com-
piler could perform kernel-wide analysis while still only adding
instrumentation to the intended subsystems. We plan to investi-
gate this as future work.
One current limitation of MPXK is that the mpxk load bounds
function currently can only retrieve the bounds of objects allocated
by kmalloc. As future work, we plan to extend this to include
pointers into static memory or the stack, which are not associated
with any allocation pool. Even if MPXK is unable to determine the
precise bounds, these pointers could still be restricted to sensible
memory areas (e.g., specific stack frames).
As a practical demonstration of MPXK real-world effectiveness,
we have tested MPXK against an exploit built around the recent
CVE-2017-7184. e vulnerability, which affects the IP packet trans-
formation framework xfrm, is a classic buffer overflow caused by
omission of an input size verification. We first confirmed that we
can successfully gain root privileges on a current Ubuntu 16.10
installation running a custom-built v4.8 kernel using the default
Ubuntu kernel configuration. We then recompiled the kernel ap-
plying MPXK on the xfrm subsystem, which caused the exploit to
fail with a bound violation reported by MPXK.
6.2 Performance
Reference counter overflows. Although the refcount t functions
consist mainly of low-overhead operations (e.g., additions and sub-
tractions), they are oen used in performance-sensitive contexts.
erefore, while absolute overhead of individual calls can be illu-
minating, we need to estimate the practical impact on overall per-
formance. We performed variousmicro-benchmarks of the individ-
ual functions during the refcount t development6. As shown in
Table 1, refcount inc introduces an average overhead of 20 CPU
cycles, compared to atomic inc. However micro-benchmarks can-
not be considered in isolation when evaluating the overall perfor-
mance impact.
To gauge the overall performance impact of refcount twe con-
ducted extensive measurements on the networking subsystem us-
ing the Netperf [31] performance measurement suite. We chose
6hp://lwn.net/Articles/718280/
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Table 1: CPU load measurements (in cycles).
Function SkyLake Sandy Bridge Ivy Bridge-EP
atomic inc() 15 13 10
refcount inc() 31 37 31
Table 2: Netperf refcount usage measurements
Netperf Test type base refcount change (stddev)
UDP CPU use (%) 0.53 0.75 +42.1% (34%)
TCP CPU use (%) 1.13 1.28 +13.3% (3%)
TCP throughput (MB/s) 9358 9305 -0.6% (0%)
TCP throughput (tps) 14909 14761 -1.0% (0%)
this subsystem because i) it is known to be performance-sensitive;
ii) it has a standardized performance measurement test suite; and
iii) we encountered severe resistance on performance groundswhen
proposing to convert this subsystem to use refcount t. e con-
cerns are well-founded due to the heavy use of reference counters
(e.g., when sharing networking sockets and data) under potentially
substantial network loads. e main challenge when evaluating
performance impact on the networking subsystem is that there are
no standardized workloads, and no agreed criteria as to what con-
stitutes “acceptable” performance overhead. Our test setup con-
sisted of physically connected server and client machines running
the mainline v4.11-rc8 kernel. We measured the real-world per-
formance impact of converting all 78 reference counters in the
networking subsystem and networking drivers from atomic t to
refcount t.
As shown in Table 2, our Netperf measurements include CPU
utilization for UDP and TCP streams, and TCP throughput in terms
of MB/s and transactions per second (tps). e results indicate
that throughput loss is negligible, but the average processing over-
head can be substantial, ranging from 13% for UDP to 42% for
TCP. e processing overhead can in many situations be accept-
able; Desktop systems typically only use networking sporadically,
and when they do, the performance is typically limited by the ISP
link speed, not CPU bolenecks. In contrast, this might not be
the case in servers or embedded systems, and routers in particu-
lar, where processing resources may be limited and networking
a major contributor to system load. However, such systems are
typically closed systems, i.e., it is not possible to install additional
applications or other untrusted soware, so therefore their aack
surface is already reduced. ese considerations are the reason
for the CONFIG REFCOUNT FULL kernel configuration option, which
can be used to disable the protection offered by refcount t when
the performance overhead is too high, whilst still allowing all other
systems to benefit from these new protection mechanisms (which
are expected to be enabled by default in the future).
Out-of-bounds memory access. MPXK incurs three types of per-
formance overhead (excluding compile-time overheads). First, the
instrumentation naturally increases CPUutilization and kernel size.
Althoughwe do not use the costlyMPX bound storage, somemem-
ory will nonetheless be used to store static global and interme-
diary bounds. Memory use comparisons, however, indicate that
the memory overhead is negligible. When deploying MPXK over
the xfrm subsystem, the memory overhead for in-memory kernel
code is 110KB, which is a 0.7% increase in total size. Kernel image
size overhead is increased by 45KB or 0.6%. Some CPU overhead
is expected due to the instrumentation and bound handling. To
measure this, we conducted micro-benchmarks on kmalloc and
memcpy, comparing the performance of MPXK and KASAN, with
the results shown in Table 3.
To beer gauge the actual runtime performance impact, we again
applied MPXK to xfrm and measured the impact on an IPSec tun-
nel where xfrmmanages the IP package transformations. For mea-
surements we used Netperf, running five-minute tests for a total
of 10 iterations. e test system was running Ubuntu 16.04 LTS
with a v4.8 Linux kernel. As shown in Table 4, there is a small re-
duction in TCP throughput, but the impact on CPU performance
is negligible.
e micro-benchmarks indicate that MPXK, as expected, intro-
duces a measurable performance overhead. However, compared to
KASAN, the performance overhead is relatively small. e large
scale tests on xfrm and Netperf confirm that similar performance
measurements hold for full real-world systems. It should further
be noted that MPXK is specifically designed for modular deploy-
ment, thus ensuring that it can be deployed incrementally without
affecting performance sensitive modules or subsystems.
6.3 Deployability
Reference counter overflows. Deploying a new data type into
a widely used system such as the Linux kernel is a significant
real-world challenge. From a usability standpoint, the API should
be as simple, focused, and self-documenting as reasonably possi-
ble. e refcount t API in principle fulfils these requirements by
providing a tightly focused API with only 14 functions. is is a
significant improvement over the 100 functions provided by the
atomic t type previously used for reference counting.
Of the 233 patches we submied, 123 are currently accepted,
and it is anticipated that the rest will be accepted in the near future.
e refcount t type has also been taken into use in independent
work by other developers7. is gives a strong indication that the
usability goals are met in practice. Our contributions also include
the Coccinelle paern used for analysis and detection of potential
reference counting schemes that can be converted to refcount t.
is paern is currently in the process of being contributed to the
mainline kernel, at which point it can be used by individual devel-
opers and in various places in the Linux kernel testing infrastruc-
ture.
Out-of-bounds memory access. As with MPX, our MPXK design
considers usability as a primary design objective. It is binary com-
patible, meaning that it can be enabled for individual translation
units. It is also source-compatible in that it does not require any
changes to source code. In some cases, pointer bounds checking
can interfere with valid pointer arithmetic or other atypical pointer
use sometimes seen in high-performance implementations. How-
ever, such compatibility issues are usually only present in architecture-
specific implementations of higher-level APIs and can thus be ac-
counted for in a centralized manner by annotating incompatible
functions to prevent their instrumentation. Compatibility issues
7hp://lkml.org/lkml/2017/6/1/762
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Table 3: MPXK and KASAN CPU overhead comparison.
baseline KASAN MPXK
time (stddev) ns diff (stddev) % diff ns diff (stdev) % diff
No bound load.
memcpy, 256 B 45 (0.9) +85 (1.0) +190% +11 (1.2) +30%
memcpy, 65 kB 2340 (4.3) +2673 (58.1) +114% +405 (5.1) +17%
Bound load needed.
memcpy, 256 B 45 (0.8) +87 (0.9) +195% +70 (1.5) +155%
memcpy, 65 kB 2332 (5.8) +2833 (28.2) +121% +475 (15.0) +20%
Table 4: Netperf measurements over an IPSec tunnel with
the xfrm subsystem protected by MPXK.
Netperf test baseline MPXK change (stddev)
UDP CPU use (%) 24.97 24.97 0.00% (0.02)%
TCP CPU use (%) 25.07 25.15 0.31% (0.29)%
TCP throughput (MB/s) 646.69 617.95 -4.44% (4.61)%
TCP throughput (tps) 1586.79 1547.85 -2.45% (1.66)%
are also usually found during compile time and are thus easily de-
tected in development. MPXK is fully integrated into Kbuild, pro-
viding predefined compilation flags for easy deployment. Using
the MPXK AUDIT parameter, MPXK can also be configured to run in
permissive mode where violations are only logged, which is useful
for development and incremental deployment.
e MPXK code-base is largely self-contained and thus easy
to maintain. e only exceptions are the wrapper functions that
are used to instrument memory manipulating functions. However,
this is not a major concern because the kernel memory manag-
ing and string API is quite stable and changes are infrequent. e
instrumentation is all contained in a GCC-plugin and is thus not
directly dependent on GCC internals. MPXK is thus both easily
deployable and easy to maintain.
7 RELATED WORK
Research on memory errors, both temporal and spatial, has long
roots both in the industry and in academia. Many solutions have
been presented to eliminate, mitigate and detect memory errors
of various types, but they typically exhibit characteristics that pre-
vent their wide deployment. Purify [16], ShadowGuarding [33, 34],
SoBound [26], as well as approaches in [18], [29, 47, 49], and [12],
have non-acceptable run-time performance. CCured [28] and Cy-
clone [14] required source code changes. In addition CCured [28],
Cyclone [14] and approach [2] are not backward compatible. More-
over, these solutions have typically focused on user-space and have
not been intended or even supported in kernel-space. Some recent
notable exceptions are kCFI [40] and KENALI [44], but they have
not from an implementation standpoint targeted actual mainline
kernel adoption. To our knowledge, none of these systems are in
production use as run-time security mechanisms. A notable ex-
ception is the PaX/Grsecurity patches that have pioneered many
in-use security mechanisms such as Address Space Layout Ran-
domization [35]. PaX/Grsecurity also includes a PAX REFCOUNT [4]
feature that prevents reference counter overflows, but this requires
extensive modification of the underlying atomic types. ese ex-
tensive changes, and a potential race condition, made this feature
unsuitable for mainline kernel adoption [4].
Some tools have reached high prominence and active use in the
debugging of memory errors. ese include Valgrind [30] which
offers a suite of six tools for debugging, profiling, and error de-
tection, including the detection of memory errors. AddressSani-
tizer [41] provides something of a gold standard in run-time mem-
ory error detection, but is unsuitable for run-time production use
due to performance overhead. KASAN [19] is integrated into the
mainline Linux kernel and offers similar protections for the ker-
nel, but again incurs performance overheads unsuitable for most
production use cases.
From a production perspective, much work has focused on pre-
venting the exploitation of memory errors. Exploitability of buffer
overflows, whether stack-based or heap-based, can be limited by
preventing an aacker from misusing overflown data. One early
mitigation technique is the non-executable (NX) bit for stack, heap
and data pages [36, 43]. However, this can be circumvented by us-
ing overflows for execution redirection into other legitimate code
memory, such as the C library in so called return-to-libc aacks,
or more generally to any executable process memory in return ori-
ented programming aacks [20]. Another mitigation technique is
the use stack canaries that allow the detection of overflows, e.g.,
StackGuard [10] and StackShield [45]. Such detection techniques
can typically be circumvented or avoided usingmore selective over-
flows that avoid the canaries, or by exploiting other callback point-
ers such as exception handlers. Probabilistic mitigation techniques
such as memory randomization [35, 46] are commonly used, but
have proven difficult to secure against indirect and direct mem-
ory leaks that divulge randomization paerns, not tomention later
techniques such as heap spraying [39].
In contrast to the development/debugging temporal safety tools
and the run-time-friendly mitigation measures, MPXK is a run-
time efficient system focused on the prevention of the underlying
memory errors. MPXK is conceptually similar to previous solu-
tions such as [14, 22, 23, 26, 28]. Like these systems, MPXK does
not use fat-pointers, which alter the implementation of pointers
to store both the pointer and the bounds together, but instead pre-
serves the original memory layout. Unlike purely soware-based
systems such as SoBound [26], MPXK has the advantage of hard-
ware registers for propagating bounds and hardware instructions
for enforcing bounds. HardBound [11] employs hardware support
similar to MPXK but has a worst case memory overhead of almost
200% and has only been simulated on the micro-operation level
and to date lacks any existing hardware support. Unlike MPXK,
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none of these previous schemes have been designed for use in the
kernel.
8 DISCUSSION
e solutions proposed in this paper and related Linux kernel main-
line patches are a step towards beer memory safety in the main-
line Linux kernel. One sobering fact when working with produc-
tion systems and distributed development communities, such as
the Linux kernel, is that there is always a trade-off between secu-
rity and deployability. Security solutions outside the mainline ker-
nel, such as the long-lived PaX/Grsecurity [15] patches can thrive,
but in order to provide wide-spread security to a diverse space of
devices, it is imperative to achieve integration into the mainline
kernel.
Future work:
Our efforts to convert the remaining reference counters to refcount t
continue, but the initial work has already sparked other implemen-
tation efforts and a renewed focus on the problem. ere are ac-
tive efforts to migrate to themainline kernel solutions that provide
high-performance architecture-independent implementations [9].
Several MPXK improvements are also le for future work. Our
support for bound loading can be extended with support for other
allocators and memory region-based bounds for pointers not dy-
namically allocated. More invasive instrumentation could also be
used to improve corner cases where function calls require bound
loading. ewrapper implementations could similarly be improved
by more invasive instrumentation, namely by forgoing wrappers
altogether and instead employing direct instrumentation at call
sites. is approach is not feasible on vanilla MPX due complica-
tions caused by the bound storage, but would be quite reasonable
for MPXK.
MPX: suggestions for improvements:
While working with Intel MPX and adapting it for kernel use, we
have identified some aspects that limit its usability for this use in
particular, but also in more general use cases. One particular chal-
lenge was lacking documentation of both hardware and compiler
behavior in atypical cases. In many cases, such behavior is im-
possible to determine without either manual run-time testing or
extensive compiler source code analysis. While these limitations
might not affect trivial user-space applications, they are glaring
problems when working with performance-critical low-level sys-
tems such as the Linux kernel. is is not ideal for a technology
that aims for wide adoption and can easily become an insurmount-
able barrier. From a pure hardware perspective, MPX currently
provides only four registers for storing bounds. By increasing the
register count, the instrumentation would be more efficient over-
all, and in particular function argument bound propagation would
benefit by being able to omit costly bound loads.
Working with Linux kernel community:
e path to successful non-trivial mainline kernel patches is of-
ten a long and rocky road, especially for security-related features
that have performance implications. Based on our experience in
working with the Linux kernel developers in this project, we offer
the following guidance for other researchers who also aim to have
their solutions merged into the mainline Linux kernel.
Understanding context. It is not enough to simply read the Linux
kernel contribution guidelines [24] and
follow them when developing your proposal. It is much more
useful to understand the context of the subsystem to which you
are aempting to contribute. By context, we mean the recent his-
tory of the subsystem and planned developments, standard ways
in which it is verified and tested, and the overall direction set by its
maintainers. Presenting your contribution by embedding it in this
context will increase the chances of its geing a fair hearing. For
example, in our MPXK work, instead of contributing changes di-
rectly to the GCC core, we implemented our GCC instrumentation
as a standalone GCC plugin (Section 5) using the GCC kernel plu-
gin framework that was just recently added to the mainline Linux
kernel. is allowed us to be aligned with the overall direction of
the GCC compiler development.
Fine-grained configurability. e Linux kernel runs on very
different types of devices and environments with different threat
models and security requirements. us any security solution (and
especially those that have performance or usability implications)
must not be monolithic but support the ability to be configured
to several different grades. For example, we designed MPXK so
that its level of protection can be independently enabled on each
compilation unit or subsystem to protect places where it is most
needed (see Section 6.3). Similarly, in our reference counter protec-
tionwork, in addition to having a configuration flag for turning off
the protection behind the refcount t interface, there is ongoing
work to provide an architecture-specific fast assembly implemen-
tation with only slightly relaxed security guarantees [9]. Also, the
conversion to the new refcount t API can happen independently
for each reference counter. Kernel maintainers can thus gradually
change their code to use refcount t rather than requiring all ker-
nel code to be changed at once (in fact, the laer is a major reason
for kernel developers turning down the PaX/Grsecurity solution
for reference counters.).
Timing. Developing and deploying any new feature that affects
more than a single kernel subsystem takes considerable time. is
is due to the number of different people involved in maintaining
various kernel subsystems and the absence of strict organization of
the development process. Researchers should plan for this to make
sure enough time is allocated. Also, one has to take into account
various stages of kernel release process to understand when it is
the best time to send your patches for review and get feedback
from maintainers. For example, it took us a full year to reach the
current state of reference counter protection work and have 123
out of 233 patches merged.
Finally, even if a proposed feature is not accepted in the end,
both maintainers and security researchers can learn from the pro-
cess, which can eventually lead to beer security in the mainline
kernel.
9 CONCLUSION
Securing the mainline Linux kernel is a vast and challenging task.
In this paper we present a set of solutions that on the one hand
limit the exploitability of memory errors by eliminating reference
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counter overflows and on the other provide hardware assisted so-
lution for enforcing pointer bounds. Both solutions are aimed at
practical deployability, with reference counter protection in partic-
ular already being widely deployed in the mainline kernel. While
our solutions arguably exhibit some limitations, they nonetheless
strike a pragmatic balance between deployability and security, thus
ensuring they are in a position to benefit the millions of devices
based on the mainline kernel.
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APPENDIX
Listing 3: Coccinelle pattern for finding reference counters
in the Linux kernel
// Check if refcount_t type and API should be used
// instead of atomic_t type when dealing with refcounters
// Confidence : Moderate
// URL : http:// coccinelle .lip6.fr/
// Options : --include -headers
virtual report
@r1 exists@
identifier a, x;
position p1 , p2;
identifier fname =˜ ".*free.*";
identifier fname2 =˜ ".* destroy .*";
identifier fname3 =˜ ".*del .*";
identifier fname4 =˜ ".* queue_work .*";
identifier fname5 =˜ ".* schedule_work .*";
identifier fname6 =˜ ".* call_rcu .*";
@@
(
atomic_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x) |
atomic_dec_and_lock@p1(&( a)->x, ...) |
atomic_long_dec_and_lock@p1(&(a)->x, ...)|
atomic_long_dec_and_test@p1(&(a)->x) |
atomic64_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x) |
local_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x)
)
...
(
fname@p2 (a, ...); |
fname2@p2 (...); |
fname3@p2 (...); |
fname4@p2 (...); |
fname5@p2 (...); |
fname6@p2 (...);
)
@script :python depends on report@
p1 << r1.p1;
p2 << r1.p2;
@@
msg = "atomic_dec_and_test␣variation
␣␣␣␣␣␣before␣object␣free␣at␣line␣\%s."
coccilib .report.print_report (p1[0],
msg \% (p2 [0].line))
@r4 exists@
identifier a, x, y;
position p1 , p2;
identifier fname =˜ ".*free.*";
@@
(
atomic_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x) |
atomic_dec_and_lock@p1(&( a)->x, ...) |
atomic_long_dec_and_lock@p1(&(a)->x, ...)|
atomic_long_dec_and_test@p1(&(a)->x) |
atomic64_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x) |
local_dec_and_test@p1(&( a)->x)
)
...
y=a
...
fname@p2 (y, ...);
@script :python depends on report@
p1 << r4.p1;
p2 << r4.p2;
@@
msg = " atomic_dec_and_test␣variation
␣␣␣␣␣␣before␣object␣free␣at␣line␣\%s."
coccilib .report .print_report (p1[0],
msg \% (p2 [0].line))
@r2 exists@
identifier a, x;
position p1;
@@
(
atomic_add_unless (&( a)->x,-1,1)@p1 |
atomic_long_add_unless(&(a)->x,-1,1)@p1 |
atomic64_add_unless(&( a)->x,-1,1)@p1
)
@script :python depends on report@
p1 << r2.p1;
@
msg = "atomic_add_unless "
coccilib .report .print_report (p1[0], msg )
@r3 exists@
identifier x;
position p1;
@@
(
x = atomic_add_return@p1(-1, ...); |
x = atomic_long_add_return@p1(-1, ...); |
x = atomic64_add_return@p1(-1, ...);
)
@script :python depends on report@
p1 << r3.p1;
@@
msg = "x␣=␣atomic_add_return (-1,␣...)"
coccilib .report .print_report (p1[0], msg )
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